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In the area of European policymaking, established parties are nowadays 
also confronted with pressure from the left-wing and right-wing fringes of 
the political spectrum. The fact is that, try as they might, they cannot ex-
plain away all the negative results of EU policymaking. Instead of fighting 
a communications war from their entrenched positions, the supporters of 
European integration should recognize that there are contradictions in 
European policies which need to be dealt with frankly on a political level. 
Some people point out that the European 
Union was built on the basis of consensus, 
whereas others warn that it needs contro-
versy, or else will lose its legitimacy. Jür-
gen Habermas and Günther Verheugen, 
two proponents of these opposing posi-
tions, crossed swords in the politics sec-
tion of the Süddeutsche Zeitung in June 
2008. “Politicize the debate,” demanded 
the former. “Bring in the citizens.” “That 
won’t work,” retorted the latter. “Europe is 
based on consensus, and not on contro-
versy. It is slow and painstaking, and of-
ten excruciating; but it is efficient. That is 
how we should go on. All of us, by working 
together.” 
 
 
And in fact after the referendum in Ireland 
the European governments and the ad-
ministration in Brussels have tried to do 
what they are best at: waiting until things 
have calmed down, conducting discreet 
talks, and preparing for another referen-
dum. However, at the same time the de-
bate on European policy, has already been 
taken out on the streets. Not by the gov-
ernments and the established political par-
ties, but by players who do not have very 
deep roots in the system. They believe that 
the voters are sufficiently irritated to re-
spond to their criticism of the Union, 
which enhances their profile and enables 
them to generate influence. In this they 
are aided and abetted by centrist govern-
ments and parties, which do not openly 
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acknowledge that there are contradictions 
in European policymaking, and react in a 
fundamentally defensive manner to fun-
damental criticism. Thus they have failed 
to lift the debate on European policy to a 
constructive and more differentiated level. 
 
As a result the debate on European policy 
remains uninspiring and the electorate 
continues to be suspicious. Furthermore, 
the extraneous and internal systemic criti-
cism of the European Union continues to 
gain momentum, and, in the context of the 
forthcoming elections to the European Par-
liament in June, is becoming more cogent. 
Will this be the first test for the assump-
tion that anger due to the Union is suffi-
ciently pronounced to reward the political 
groupings which actually reject the EU? 
 
I 
Who is criticizing what 
Taken as a whole, the critics of Europe are 
fragmented and rather inscrutable. And 
ever since the “No” votes in the referen-
dums in France, the Netherlands and Ire-
land they have started to be in a state of 
flux, and new euro-critical groups are 
making an appearance. Nationalist parties 
are reorganizing themselves. Classical 
protest movements are stating their argu-
ments in a new and upbeat manner. At the 
same time the topics and the mode of ex-
pression are moving in from the fringes to 
some of the centrist parties, which quite 
obviously believe that they have to show 
where they stand so as not to lose voters 
to their new opponents. 
„Eurocriticism is moving in 
from the fringes to some 
of the centrist parties.” 
Libertas, the newcomer among the right-
wing critics of Europe, has provoked some 
broken coalitions and new alliances in the 
right-wing and conservative camp 
throughout Europe (for example, in 
France, the Czech Republic, and in Portu-
gal). This pan-European party is a product 
of the Irish anti-Lisbon campaign. In the 
entrepreneur Declan Ganley it has an am-
bitious and by now fairly well-known 
leader who has described the debate on 
the Treaty of Lisbon as a political awaken-
ing which he wishes to share with all 
other Europeans. Yet hitherto Libertas has 
achieved fame more on account of its his-
tory than as a result of its political posi-
tions, and Ganley is finding it more diffi-
cult to recruit suitable comrades-in-arms 
in the member states than he had antici-
pated. A meeting with euro-critical Czech 
President Vaclav Klaus generated a lot of 
buzz, but the Libertas lists include either 
unfamiliar names or well-known radical 
nationalists such as Frenchman Philippe 
de Villiers. Yet Ganley differs from the ma-
jority of right-wing nationalists not only 
on account of his slick appearance, but 
also on account of his market radicalism, 
which he has in common with self-
appointed “EU dissident” Klaus. Both of 
them believe that the Treaty of Lisbon 
stipulates economic and social norms 
which simply go too far. In February 2009 
Vaclav Klaus summed this up in a speech 
to the European Parliament as follows. “It 
needs to be said quite openly that the cur-
rent EU economic system is a system 
which oppresses market forces and con-
tinually strengthens central control of the 
economy. (...) The solution can only be the 
liberalization and deregulation of the 
European economy.” 
 
Since Libertas is still a party without a 
manifesto three weeks before the Euro-
pean elections, statements about political 
positions can only be made on a provi-
sional basis. However, when it comes to 
communication and marketing, Libertas is 
certainly innovative. It landed a real pub-
lic relations coup by managing to secure 
the support of Polish trade union legend 
Lech Walesa. At the start of the election 
campaign in Rome Walesa told the dele-
gates to be courageous. “You have the po-
tential to change Europe for the better.” 
Walesa’s appearance was not only of con-
siderable importance on account of his  
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popularity. He is a member of the group of 
“Wise Men” which has been assembled by 
the heads of state and government and 
next year is due to present its vision of the 
future of the European Union. 
 
Libertas not only makes use of prominent 
names, but also utilizes the new media in 
a professional way. The few messages are 
presented on its website in a style that is 
straightforward and easy to understand. In 
a manner reminiscent of the Obama 
method, the visitor is asked either to be-
come involved or at least to sign up to the 
mailing list. Ganley himself has not made 
any mistakes in public. Hard-hitting stuff 
such as “We’re going to hunt for Barroso!” 
he leaves to his comrades-in-arms and pre-
fers to cultivate the image of a successful 
businessman who wants to put things 
right in the political sphere. In this way he 
has managed to 
prise right-wing 
euro-criticism o
of its unsavoury 
nationalist sur-
roundings, 
thereby making 
it more palatable 
to the main-
stream, and thus 
putting pressure 
on other conser-
vative parties. 
 
On the left-wing 
fringe of the po-
litical spectrum a 
number of actors have adopted a euro-
critical stance. They include the pan-
European protest network Attac, and left-
wing parties such as Die Linke in Germany 
and Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste (NPA) in 
France. At the end of the 1990s Attac and 
its systemic critics had demonstrated that 
they are able to seize on a certain topic 
and turn on the heat in political terms. Re-
cently they have begun to focus on the 
European Union. Despite the fact that they 
stand aloof from the system – they are not 
in favour of “marching through the institu-
tions” – there are clearly visible links to 
political parties, in Germany, for example, 
to Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, and especially 
to Die Linke, which for the 2009 European 
elections has adopted a more strident 
euro-critical tone. Even if Lothar Bisky, the 
party leader, always emphasizes his 
party’s essentially pro-European attitude, 
there have been, especially with regard to 
assessments of the Treaty of Lisbon, bitter 
disputes within the party, in the course of 
which those who completely reject the 
treaty have gained the upper hand. 
 
Left-wing criticism of Europe tends to see 
the EU as a purely elitist project, espe-
cially a project of the economic elite. Busi-
ness and capitalist interests, such critics 
complain, are deliberately encouraged, a 
fact which they trace back to the neo-
liberal ideology of European treaties, poli-
cymaking and court rulings. A general mo-
tion proposed at the party congress of Die 
Linke in Essen devoted to European mat-
ters stated that “The confiscation of the 
money of female and male workers and of 
those who are socially disadvantaged has 
swept more and more capital into the in-
ternational financial markets. The deregu-
lation of the international financial mar-
kets was a project that the European gov-
ernments also supported.” Beyond the con-
fines of the EU, development and peace 
policy were supposedly being neglected. 
Both EU enlargement in eastern Europe 
and negotiations on regional trade agree-
ments are repeatedly cited as examples of  
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wrong-headed policymaking. “The EU 
Commission continues to propagate free 
trade as the basis for ‘competitive econo-
mies’ and as ‘the catalyst for development’ 
and is thus the ‘lackey of the European 
corporations’.” 
 
Furthermore, the policy of the EU was in-
creasingly being used for the imperialist 
enforcement of capitalist interests. “The 
present common EU security and defence 
policy is based on the offensive military 
capability of the European Union and re-
armament.” For these critics such defi-
ciencies are part and parcel of the whole 
system, and for this reason they reject all 
of the reform treaties out of hand (Consti-
tution, Lisbon). 
 
With regard to European policy issues, the 
centrist parties are under pressure from 
the left and the right. In Declan Ganley the 
right-wing and conservative camp now has 
a publicly effective leader whom the 
masses find congenial. In Germany Die 
Linke is the first player to act in a decid-
edly euro-critical manner.  
 
The CSU has simultaneously reacted to 
this development by adopting tougher 
European policy positions. The CSU Euro-
pean election manifesto includes the fol-
lowing statements. “We are asking for 
fewer decisions to be made centrally in 
Brussels.” (…) “We trust that the Federal 
Constitutional Court will strictly examine 
whether the EU has adhered to the legally 
valid assignment of responsibilities.” (…) 
“We want to take decisions about land and 
property ourselves.” (…) Furthermore, 
there is a promise to create more democ-
racy and grass-roots policymaking with 
the help of referendums on European top-
ics. 
 
Recently Bündnis 90/Die Grünen has 
voiced more vociferous criticism of the EU 
and have put Sven Giegold, co-founder of 
Attac Germany, on the party list for the 
European Parliament. In Austria both of 
the two large popular parties, the SPÖ and 
the ÖVP, have relinquished their pro-
European positions, and as a result pro-
voked a breakdown of the governing coali-
tion last year. The FPÖ and the BZÖ con-
tinue to pursue their national, populist, 
exclusionist and protectionist line with 
success, as do Vlaams Belang in Belgium, 
Fidesz in Hungary, and Lega Nord in Italy. 
In France the Socialists are embroiled in 
bitter disputes, not only within the party 
itself. They are also being goaded from the 
left of the political spectrum by the NPC 
and its charismatic leader, Olivier Be-
sancenot. 
 
In the United Kingdom hardly anyone still 
believes that New Labour can actually win 
the forthcoming elections. David Cameron, 
the Conservative leader, is thought to have 
a very good chance of becoming the next 
prime minister. However, the members of 
his party in the European Parliament are 
just on the point of withdrawing from the 
union of European Conservative and Chris-
tian Democrat parties, since they consider 
the pro-European stance of many of their 
fellow politicians, including the CDU, to be 
insupportable. 
 
The critics seem to be making a lot of 
headway. Yet the classical pro-European 
centrist parties are making it all too easy 
for them by choosing to ignore most of the 
contentious issues with which they have 
been confronted and are failing to shift the 
debate to a constructive level. 
 
II 
Who is turning what into 
a taboo 
“Germany more than anyone else profits 
from the internal market!” “Where would 
we be without the euro in this crisis?” 
“Mobile phone rates!” “Cheap flights!” 
These are some of the typical replies that 
are trotted out as soon as anyone says 
anything that smacks of criticism. An 
online spot produced by the European 
Movement network shows quite clearly the 
whole gamut of European blessings which  
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I
t
’
s
 
h
i
p
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
a
 
e
u
r
o
-
c
r
i
t
i
c
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
a
g
e
 
5
 
#
 
2
0
0
9
/
0
5
 
can be marshalled to deal with criticism of 
any kind. Watching the film, the critic 
simply gives up and withdraws his ques-
tion, “What has Europe ever actually done 
for us?” as a result of this barrage of posi-
tive answers. Hans-Gert Pöttering, the 
President of the European Parliament, 
must have been hoping that similar things 
would happen when at the beginning of 
the year he spoke on the subject of “Com-
municating the European Parliament elec-
tions.” He pointed out that not every topic 
that was dealt with and voted on in the 
European Parliament was easy to explain 
to the public. But there were numerous 
successes and decisions which actually 
produced a specific, easily comprehensible 
and explicable value for EU citizens. “It is 
our task,” Pöttering said, “to look for these 
topics, to concentrate on them in our pub-
lic relations and thus to inform the citi-
zens about the value of our work.”  
 
Politicians in the government, so it seems, 
are determined to fight a communications 
war from their entrenched positions, 
whilst the European citizen – if one is to 
believe the latest Eurobarometer surveys – 
is moving farther and farther away from 
the scene of the action. He or she may be 
pleased about sinking mobile telephone 
costs, freedom of travel and consumer pro-
tection, but does not seem to be convinced 
that this means that everything in the 
European world is neat and tidy and in or-
der. In fact, he directly experiences the 
disadvantages of European policymaking 
just as much as the advantages. Unfortu-
nately, the disadvantages are talked about 
only by specialists or populists. 
 
In the following section two examples are 
adduced to illustrate how EU policymaking 
has an effect on important sections of so-
ciety–which in a national context are ac-
cepted as an important source of feedback 
about a specific policy– and can influence 
their attitude to the project of European 
integration. On a local level the effect of 
certain internal market freedoms can lead 
to friction between basic political rights 
and local arrangements on the one hand 
and the basic freedoms of the internal 
market on the other. 
 
The example of non-profit associations in 
the Tübingen area may help to elucidate 
this. The associations of the town and the 
surrounding district used to finance them-
selves by collecting and selling scrap pa-
per. As long as only a small amount of 
money could be made in this way there 
were no conflicts of interest with private 
waste management companies. But last 
year, as prices of resources soared, the 
private firms entered the market and 
placed blue collecting bins on the streets. 
The Administrative Court ruled that on the 
basis of Article 13 of the Recycling Law 
the freedom to engage in business also 
had priority in the case of resources such 
as scrap paper. The blue bins could stay. 
The sources of income of non-profit-
making clubs and societies are drying up. 
A change in Article 13 – which regulates 
the relationship between the provision of 
essential services and the freedom to en-
gage in business in the waste management 
sector – and other political options, for ex-
ample, local exceptions for the waste man-
agement industry, were discussed and 
then rejected. The ministry in Berlin re-
sponsible for this issue believed that the 
waste management industry was quite 
clearly covered by the provisions of the in-
ternal market.  
 
Thus Berlin points its finger towards Brus-
sels and tells the non-profit associations 
via the local government “We cannot do 
anything for you. These are the freedoms 
of the internal market.” The reasons given 
are correct in both legal and macroeco-
nomic terms, and the political responsibil-
ity cannot be clearly assigned. It is true 
that these decisions were made in Brus-
sels, but there is no mention of the fact 
that Berlin actually participates in EU de-
cision-making. It would be more honest to 
reply as follows. “We agree with the cur-
rent state of EU legislation and for the fol-
lowing reasons,” or “We criticize the cur-
rent state of legislation and are in favour 
of making the following changes.”  
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Here European policymaking affects EU 
citizens in a direct and unmistakable way. 
But at the same time clubs and societies in 
towns and villages are a powerful source 
of feedback with regard to their interpreta-
tion of the situation on the ground. “Vol-
untary work is being made more difficult 
by market economy principles. It is all the 
fault of the EU.” It is difficult to say 
whether cheaper telephone calls can dis-
pel views of this kind. 
 
The issue cannot be the idea of calling the 
internal market into question. It is an im-
portant pillar of the European Union. 
Without the enforcement of the four basic 
freedoms of the internal market and strict 
laws governing competition, a common 
currency would be difficult to envisage. 
Whereas a group of specialists has for 
years been discussing and conducting ne-
gotiations on the role of the basic free-
doms of the internal market in the area of 
the provision of essential services and lo-
cal self-government (for example, the Com-
mission’s green and white papers on ser-
vices of general interest, the protocol note 
of the Treaty of Lisbon on this subject, or 
the subsequent communications by the 
Commission), the official European dis-
course simply ignores these contradic-
tions. 
 
 
A similar dispute is concerned with the ef-
fects of EU legislation on wage bargaining 
autonomy. ECJ judgements, as for example 
in the case of Viking, Laval and Rüffert, 
are adduced as a warning that the EU is 
undermining basic rights such as the right 
to strike or wage bargaining autonomy. In 
the case of Rüffert the ECJ ruled that only 
generally applicable wage 
agreements (i.e. two per 
cent) were binding for 
foreign employers. Thus 
with its definition of the 
law the ECJ has had an 
effect on the basic pillars 
of the German collective 
wage bargaining system. 
For this reason Frank 
Bsirske, chairman of the 
Ver.di trade union, argued 
in an open letter to Chan-
cellor Merkel that the ECJ 
“claims to possess compe-
tences to which it is not 
entitled and which have 
not been transferred to 
the European Union and 
its institutions by Article 23 of the Basic 
Law.” The Chancellor’s answer, which un-
fortunately has not been made public, falls 
back, going by the available quotations, on 
two arguments which have become de 
rigueur in the European context. First, 
such a matter could not gain sufficient 
support in Brussels, and, secondly, as a 
result of the Treaty of Lisbon–and espe-
cially the Charter of Fundamental Rights–
everything was going to be much better. 
“You say nothing at all about this, dear 
Chancellor. Instead you point to the inclu-
sion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
in the Basic Treaty...,” Bsirske said in his 
reply. 
 
That trade unions and associations are 
powerful sources of political feedback is a 
truism on the nation-state level. Thus it is 
all the more remarkable that this fact 
should be ignored when the topic is the 
European Union. “Viking,” “Laval” and 
“Rüffert” have become the war cries of the 
trade unions and left-wing critics of  
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Europe. Ignoring them certainly does not 
help to generate more understanding for 
European policymaking. 
 
The responsibility which has been shunted 
off to Brussels not only lacks an addressee 
because debates and votes in the European 
Council are not made public, but also be-
cause unanimity and the principle of col-
legiality in the Commission have become 
cornerstones of European policymaking. 
The European level cultivates rules of con-
duct and negotiating practices based on 
diplomatic manners which have little to do 
with a public struggle for a particular 
course of action based on democratic pro-
cedures, rules and regulations. The quality 
of the democratic process becomes appar-
ent not only on account of its legitimacy, 
but as a result of transparency and per-
ceivable responsibility. A differentiated 
perception of the members of the Commis-
sion is slowly beginning to emerge. An 
openly conducted conflict such as the one 
between French President Sarkozy and EU 
Trade Commissioner Mandelson last year 
is still rather rare. Originally this way of 
doing things was intended to protect the 
commissioners and to ensure that they 
were independent of their countries of ori-
gin, but today it also facilitates undifferen-
tiated criticism of the Commission. Euro-
pean policymaking, and this is a solemn 
declaration that crops up in every official 
discourse, is an integral part of the daily 
lives of Europeans. However, that the lat-
ter do not only benefit from the advan-
tages of such policymaking, but sometimes 
have to endure the disadvantages is usu-
ally never mentioned. This vacuum devoid 
of meaning is seized on by populists and 
critics of Europe, and they fill it up with 
views of their own. 
 
III 
The Future European  
Discourse 
“The people,” Kurt Tucholsky once wrote, 
“may misunderstand most things, but they 
have a sense for what is true..” If he was 
right, then surely Europe must plunge 
citizens into a state of emotional chaos. 
Who or what can they believe? Those who 
tell them “Everything is going to be al-
right?” Or those who tell them “Everything 
is going down the drain”? Especially when 
what they experience is somewhere in be-
tween. The absence of a differentiated dis-
course about the realities of European poli-
tics paves the way for populists and radi-
cal critics and is reminiscent in structural 
terms of the asylum and migration debates 
of the 1990s. In those days the doctrine 
espoused by the state (“Germany is not a 
country of immigration. We do not have a 
problem with foreigners.”) no longer cor-
responded to reality and was thus very 
useful for those who wanted to make po-
litical capital out of the issue. The situa-
tion first changed after the large political 
parties had agreed to say “Germany is, 
like all European states, a country of im-
migration. And there is, as in all European 
states, an integration problem.” 
„Subsidiarity to be borne 
in mind as responsibility.” 
In order to restore credibility to the Euro-
pean discourse and to pull the rug from 
under the populists’ feet there is a need 
for a similar shift in perception. Initially 
this would involve an admission that there 
are contradictions in European policymak-
ing, and that they need to be thrashed out 
politically. This would entail not only re-
specting the maturity of EU citizens and 
assuming responsibility for one’s political 
decisions by dealing with the societal con-
sequences, but also including an aware-
ness of such contradictions in the Euro-
pean policymaking process.  
 
Subsidiarity is an important principle. The 
endless and ongoing debate on this subject 
erroneously leads one to believe that lev-
els function quite separately from one an-
other and that the efficacy of specific 
measures remains confined to the areas 
for which political decision-makers are re-
sponsible. However, subsidiarity cannot  
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merely be part of a debate about who is 
responsible for what. Subsidiarity also 
signifies that every level of responsibility 
has a duty to bear in mind and understand 
the effect of its policies on other levels. 
Civil society and individual citizens would 
do well to ask their governments to act on 
these lines. “What do you intend to do 
with regard to Europe?” is a sensible ques-
tion. It is also appropriate when there are 
national and local elections. 
 
However, at the moment the critics of 
Europe seem to be doing rather well. At 
the European elections in June it will be-
come apparent whether or not they can ac-
tually mobilize voters, or if they are sim-
ply grabbing the headlines. It would not be 
the first time at elections to the European 
Parliament that a good result was achieved 
by a combination of a generally low turn-
out, the simultaneous mobilization of one’s 
own camp, and the support of numerous 
protest voters. The Front National showed 
how this can be done in previous elec-
tions. So did the League of Polish Families, 
which on the basis of this selfsame recipe 
attained the second-best result in Poland 
in 2004. 
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